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Kurt Vonnegut, in his book titled Slapstick, weaves a 
tale around shadowy characters who can selectively increase 
the force of gravity, and cause large groups of individuals 
to feel sluggish. After looking at a number of rural credit 
activities in low income countries (LICs) the past dozen 
years, I am tempted to conclude that someone like Vonnegut's 
mischievous characters are applying their knowledge to these 
activities; most agricultural credit programs exhibit symp-
toms of excess "gs" pulling on their vital organs. In very 
few cases are these rural financial markets (RFMs) doing an 
adequate job of meeting equity and efficiency objectives, 
and far too many agricultural credit agencies are "black 
holes" into which large amounts of money, managerial time, 
and talent disappear.!/ These results are especially disap-
pointing given the emphasis by governments and donor agen-
cies on expanding the quantity and quality of farm credit 
services the three decades; donor agencies have granted or 
lent in excess of 15 billion u.s. dollars over this period 
for agricultural credit. It is even more disappointing that 
!/ For more detail on these problems see Adams and others 
editors, Von Pischke and others editors, and Gordon Donald. 
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most policy makers are resigned to mediocre rural credit 
programs. 
Until recently, difficulties in each agricultural ere-
dit program were thought to be unique. Diversity in the 
agencies providing loans helped reinforce this impression. 
Problems were typically individualized and blame was 
assigned to diverse reasons such as incompetent managers and 
staffs, or to corrupt and inefficient governments. 
Management replacement, reorganizing and renaming of the 
credit agency, nationalizing the lenders, shifting credit 
programs from troubled agencies to new ones, and additional 
regulations and controls have been some of the traditional 
treatments for these problems. Despite these prescriptions, 
serious loan recovery problems persist, the reluctance of 
loan officers to lend to farmers and to the rural poor pre-
vails, political considerations continue to strongly 
influence agriciltural lending procedures, and many of the 
lending agencies flounder because their costs of lending 
exceed revenues. It is clear to me, at least, that these 
traditional treatments for ills in rural financial markets 
are not attacking the roots of the problems. The similarity 
of these difficulties across lenders and countries also lead 
me to think that a few common, not unique, causes may be 
responsible for these cronic difficulties, and that uniform 
treatments might be appropriate. 
In my opinion there are several reasons for the ineffec-
tive treatments of RFM ills: First, a good deal of confusion 
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exists about the operations of these markets. The diffused 
nature of RFMs makes it difficult to easily understand their 
operations, and traditional assuptions and policies are 
widely applied but little tested. Far too many important 
policy decisions about RFMs are based on sterotypes, horror 
stories, and dogmas. Also, too many people think of a loan 
as a productive input, rather than as a general claim on any 
good or service in the market. In addition, too few people 
view financial intermediaries as independent decision makers 
who produce diverse financial services that can easily 
adjust to meet changing conditions. Policy makers have 
incorrectly viewed financial markets as a thin vail, or as a 
set of irrigation channels whose headgates were manned by 
robots. Because rural financial intermediation is 
geographically dispersed and involves a very large number of 
participants, and because financial instruments are highly 
fungible and divisible, the feeling of control over these 
markets that many policy makers have is illusionary. 
Defective and incomplete problem diagnosis is a second 
reason for the persistent difficulties found in RFMs, and is 
the main focus of this essay. Too much of this analysis is 
similar to old medical prognoses that blamed fevers on bad 
night air, and other ills on the patient having humors that 
were out of balance. Because of faulty physical examina-
tions, early shamans and physicians were unable to isolate 
causes of major illnesses. In some cases the treatments, 
such as the bleeding of patients, became part of the problem. 
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I am convinced that something similar is taking place in 
many RFMs. Treatments are applied without an adequate exa-
mination of the patients and some "remedies" create ills 
more serious than the problems they aim at curing. 
My principal objective in this paper is to outline a 
diagnostic procedure that might better allow investigators 
to identify the sources of problems plaguing RFMs. Because 
some of the causes are incorrect policies, I also discuss 
how the diagnostic process can be used to encourage policy 
changes. I will conclude that a number of factors contri-
bute to the poor performance of RFMs, and that this forces 
"doctors of finance" to do extensive diagnoses. 
A Digression on the United States 
There are substantial differences in the concerns of 
those who work on agricultural credit problems in the United 
States, and those who worry about problems of rural finance 
in LICs. U.S. researchers have concentrated on the role of 
credit in farmers' management of risk and firm growth along 
with some work on lender performance (Brake and Melichar). 
Much of this research is aimed at helping farmers to better 
manage their operations and also to help lenders do a better 
job of serving farmers. Those who work on problems in LICs 
have also wrestled with farm level credit use questions, but 
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have usually tried to estimate credit impact or credit 
demand (e.g. David and Meyer}. In large part this research 
is directed at providing information for policy makers 
rather than for RFM participants. In recent years, 
researchers on LIC problems have also looked at the overail 
performance of RFMs, how various policies affect this per-
formance, and how financial markets participate in mobi-
lizing voluntary savings. None of these three issues has 
received much attention in u.s. research. 
These differences in research are strongly influenced 
by pressing RFM problems in most LICs, and the general lack 
of difficulties in these markets in the U.S. Several unique 
features in the u.s. also influence agricultural credit 
research. These include a weak central bank, secure land 
titles, a reasonably efficient judicial system, and politi-
cal stability. This is reinforced by a generally prosperous 
agricultural sector that makes many farmers creditworthy. 
Government investments in farming, price supports, and 
highly productive resources in agriculture contribute to 
this prosperity. 
RFMs in the u.s. are also somewhat unique in the way 
they obtain funds for lending. Commercial banks rely 
heavily on rural deposits, while the cooperative credit 
system draws money from bond markets. Even with the Farmers 
Home Administration, the Commodity Credit Corporation and 
several other credit programs, the u.s. government currently 
1 
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plays a limited role in the operations of u.s. RFMs. Most of ~-~ 
the agricultural credit allocation decisions result from 
market forces and satisfactory performance is taken for 
granted. Few of these features are found in most LICs, and 
governments and donors typically feel that RFMs must be 
forced to lend more to farmers. This, combined with empha-
sis on central planning, causes research in LICs to place 
much more stress on national policy issues than is true in 
the u.s. 
Preliminaries to Diagnosis 
Before doing RFM diagnosis it is useful to clarify four 
issues. The first is to understand what financial markets 
do. The second is to identify the relevant decision-making 
units involved in rural financial intermediation. The third 
is to recognize the strengths and weaknesses of RFM data. 
And, the fourth is to outline the steps that must be includ-
ed in a physical examination of a particular RFM. 
What Financial Markets Do 
Until recently, Keynesian and development economics 
gave relatively little attention to financial inter-
mediation. Work by Goldsmith, Gurley, Shaw, and Patrick 
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during the 1960s and early 1970s helped to clarify the 
important support that finance gives to economic develop-
ment. As Long has pointed out, finance makes four contribu-
tions to a commercial economy: it provides efficient 
mediums of exchange, it encourages more efficient resource 
reallocation through transferring claims on resources from 
surplus to deficit units, it provides for the transformation 
and redistribution of risk among units, and finance can be 
used as an important tool in economic stabilization activi-
ties (in Von Pischke and others, editors}. 
The operations of financial markets can also strongly 
influence income and asset ownership distributions and can 
affect multipurpose organizations that provide rural finan-
cial services.l/ Many agricultural cooperatives have been 
weakened by their agricultural credit activities. Also, in 
many cases, there is a very close relationship between the 
political system and financial markets. In some cases 
financial markets, especially those in rural areas, may be 
important vehicles for allocating political patronage (see 
Kane, Ladman and Tinnermeier, and Robert for further 
details}.l/ 
~/ Several essays by Adams, Adams and Tommy, Gonzalez-Vega, 
and Vogel in Adams and others, eds., provide details on 
how financial markets affect income distributions. 
ll In Adams and others, eds., and in Von Pischke and others, 
eds. 
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Decision Making Units 
By nature, financial markets involve many decision-
making units whose behavior must be understood for 
diagnostic purposes. These units include the farm-household 
savers and borrowers, the non-farm rural firms that borrow 
and save, formal and informal financial intermediaries, the 
central bank, the political system and/or the government, 
and the donor agencies. In addition to understanding the 
behavior of these units, the diagnosticians must also con-
sider the collective behavior of all of these units~ and not 
be mesmerized by the activities in only a single riredit pro-
ject or institution. For example, a donor funded project 
may stress making additional long term loans to farmers and 
be successful. in doing so through one segment of the finan-
cial market. At the same time, other parts of the rural 
financial system may reduce the number of long term loans by 
a greater amount. The net result of this would be a 
decrease in the amount of money available through RFMs for 
long term loans. A holistic approach is needed to document 
the performance of these markets. 
Data Limitations 
Financial markets are largely information gathering 
systems. The information that moves through the formal 
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system is usually loan specific. The formal lender gathers 
data to establish the creditworthiness of potential 
borrowers and to keep track of loan repayment. (Informal 
lenders do much the same thing through intimate knowledge of 
their clients.) This includes information on the loan size, 
justification given for the loan, some loan terms, and the 
source of funds used to make the loan. Well managed credit 
agencies also have information on the repayment status of 
loans. This generally does not include readily available 
details on loans that have been refinanced, or information 
on the length of time loans are overdue.· In those cases 
where external donor agencies are involved, it is common for 
a good deal of information to be gathered for periodic 
reports to donors on the progress made in disbursing and 
collecting "the funds" provided by donors. In tew cases are 
these reports of value to credit managers. 
It is dangerous to make firm conclusions about the 
characteristics of borrowers and savers based on aggregate 
information published by most credit agencies or central 
banks. One has to be especially careful not to draw erro-
neous conclusions about the number of low income borrowers 
serviced by using the number of small loans made, for 
example. People who are well-off may borrow small amounts, 
and they may also have multiple small-to-medium loans, some-
times from several agencies. One must also be careful in 
I c. drawing conclusions about the impact of loans based on the 
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reasons given to justify loans. These justifications and 
loan use may, or may not, be closely associated with the 
marginal changes in liquidity use in the borrowing unit. 
For example, a farmer may justify a loan for the purpose of 
buying a cow, and may, with the loan, buy a new animal as 
specified in loan documents. It is possible, however, that 
the farmer would have purchased the cow, without the loan, 
with his or her own funds. In this case, the net effect of 
the loan is not the purchase of an additional cow, but 
rather the new activity undertaken by the borrower with the 
owned funds substituted for by the loan. Clarifying the 
strengths and weakness of the data that are available and 
laying out additional information that must be collected 
from primary sources is a major step in RFM diagnosis. 
Steps in Diagnosis 
There are at least five steps that should be included 
in the diagnosis of any RFM. The weights placed on each of 
these steps and the sequence in which they are done are 
largely time and place specific, and depend heavily on local 
policy concerns. Including local technicians, researchers, 
and policy makers in developing the work plan for a RFM sec-
tor assessment is a critical part of the process. The 
assessment itself should include historical information on 
• 
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(1) the structure and make up of the rural financial market 
and (2) details on public RFM objectives an RFM perfor-
mance. A careful inventory of the (3) major policies that 
influence RFM activities is also a vital part of the diagno-
sis. This should include detailing how policy decisions are 
made and who makes these decisions. Background information 
on the overall financial market and money policies in the 
country must also be analyzed. 
In those cases where (4) donor agencies and/or govern-
ments have directed a number of programs or projects through 
RFMs, these efforts should be detailed. Finally, it is 
important to (5) design the assessment so that policy makers 
are stimulated by the diagnostic process to make appropriate 
policy adjustments. Policy changes, not a final report, 
ought to be the end product of the RFM diagnosis. Major 
considerations in each of these steps are briefly outlined 
in the following discussion. 
Market Structure 
Most studies of RFMs collect a substantial amount of 
information on the make up of the formal market. This 
includes an inventory of the agencies that provide loans for 
agricultural purposes and the amounts of agricultural loans 
provided. Most central banks collect this information from 
the commercial banks and major government agricultural banks. 
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It is sometimes necessary to supplement this information 
with additional data on loans made by cooperatives, credit 
unions, crop development agencies, area development 
programs, agrarian reform agencies, and risk capital organi-
zations. Where possible this information should be gathered 
for the past several decades and should include both year-
e nd-balance (stock), and new loan (flow) figures in both 
nominal and real terms. 
It is generally more difficult to get a clear idea 
about the make up of the informal rural financial markets. 
Large cross sectional studies aimed at documenting the 
extent and nature of informal markets can be costly. It is 
also common for these surveys to miss a good deal of lending 
that takes place between friends and relatives, and to fail 
to pin down short term loans that are mixed up with buying 
and selling of products. While it is useful to do limited 
surveys to establish a general idea about the relative 
importance of informal finance and to establish the range of 
arrangements made, it is much more important to clarify the 
economics of informal lending. What kinds of services do 
informal lenders provide to their clients? What are the 
costs of lending and the costs of borrowing in informal 
markets? What are the opportunity costs of the money lent 
by informal lenders? What is the degree of competition 
among informal lenders? What types of informal lending 
practices are useful for formal lenders to emulate? 
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In addition to collecting information on the volume of 
loans made by formal and informal lenders, information should 
also be collected on the various types of deposits handled 
by RFMs. 
Objectives and Performance 
The usefulness of a RFM is measured by the degree to 
which its services help meet public policy objectives. It 
is important to recognize that firms and individuals pro-
viding financial services in rural areas are usually 
involved in multiple activities or produce several products. 
Under these circumstances, it should not be surprising that 
these firms and individuals can change the types and amounts 
of financial services offered relatively easily if they find 
it in their interest to do so. 
The specific objectives that a govemnment attempts to 
achieve through rural financial markets varies across 
countries and through time within countries. At least four 
common publically stated objectives, however, are pursued 
through most RFMs. These are (1) that financial markets 
should help the poor. (2) That the operations of financial 
markets should result in more efficient allocation of 
resources. (3) That RFM activities should boost government 
14 
efforts in other productive sectors. And, (4) that finan-
cial intermediaries should evolve into strong and self suf-
f icient institutions. 
Two groups of.performance measures should be employed 
in the diagnosis. The first focuses on the performance of 
the entire RFM, while the other sheds light on the perfor-
mance of individual intermediaries or credit programs. 
Historically, evaluations of RFM activities have stressed 
the latter at the expense of the former, but both types of 
information are necessary to establish cause and effect. 
The specific performance measures used must be those that 
shed light on the extent to which financial markets are 
helping to achieve public goals. For example, if an objec-
tive is to provide more financial services to the rural 
poor, performance measures must clarify the characteristics 
of those who borrow and save in financial markets and the 
extent of their benefits. Also if an objective is to expand 
the amount of agricultural lending, performance indicators 
must focus on measuring the nominal as well as real amounts 
lent for agricultural purposes, and also show what is hap-
pening to this type of lending in relative terms. 
For data problem reasons pointed out earlier it is not 
generally clear who is receiving the major benefits of RFMs 
operations. Clearly, those who receive no loans and hold no 
financial savings deposits do not directly benefit from 
these services. It is also clear that those who are able to ~ 
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get large loans at concessionary interest rates or who 
default on large loans benefit substantially from borrowing. 
A large part of what a financial market does is masked by 
the large number of small to medium sized loans and deposits 
that it handles. It takes a good deal of digging to clarify 
the economic characteristics of those who use these services 
and the amounts of benefits they receive. 
The benefits from use of loans fall into three 
categories: normal gains from use of leverage through 
borrowing, income transfers that result from negative real 
rates of interest on loans, and the benefits that go to 
those who default on their loans and take the money as a 
once-and-for-all transfer of income. The amount of benefit 
realized from loan leverage is very difficult to document 
across a large number of borrowers. It, like the other two 
types of benefits, nevertheless, is proportional to the 
amount of money borrowed. The more money borrowed the more 
benefits. Because of the possibilities of one borrower 
holding multiple loans, loan size distribution information 
will give only a lower bound on the loan concentration 
question. Some borrower interviewing must be done to docu-
ment the extent of multiple loans and to clarify who is 
defaulting on loans. Some aggregate measures of the amount 
of income transferred to borrowers through default and nega-
tive real rates of interest, along with the "tax" placed on 
financial savers through negative real rates of interest, 
can be useful performance measures • 
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It is impossible to directly measure the extent to 
which RFMs are helping to allocate resources more eff i-
c iently. The bits and pieces of economic gains made from 
efficient financial intermediation are virtually impossible 
to empirically aggregate. Several indirect measures, 
however, can be used to give a general idea of efficiency 
performance. The first measure is of how well financial 
activities are integrated in rural areas. This is best 
measured by the borrowing costs from various elements of the 
RFM. If there are substantial variations in these borrowing 
costs for similar quality loan services, this indicates that 
RFMs are fragmented and that loans are being rationed among 
borrowers and some are being excluded. 
Detailed information on the total costs of financial 
intermediation, including both borrower and lender portions 
of these costs shed a good deal of light on fragmentation 
questions. How lenders absorb or allocate their loan tran-
saction costs can also show the extent to which these tran-
saction costs are used by the lender to ration credit under 
interest rate controls. Information on the types of innova- · 
tions adopted by financial intermediaries can also provide 
insights on these issues. How does an innovation affect the 
lender's costs, the borrower's costs, and the quality of the 
service provided by the lender? Is the innovator largely 
motivated by desires to reduce the costs of financial inter-
• 
mediation, or is it largely an attempt by the intermediary ~ 
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to evade the intent of regulation? Does the innovation 
reduce the total costs of financial intermediation shared by 
the borrower and the lender? Also, is the proportion of the 
total costs of financial intermediation incurred by the 
lender a sensitive measure of the degree of credit rationing 
through reallocation of loan transaction costs to the 
borrowers, and thus a proxy for the degree of fragmentation 
found in RFMs? 
A number of direct measures can be used to indicate the 
degree to which RFMs respond to government priorities in 
terms of farm enterprises, term structures of loans and 
lending to priority sectors. Several measures can also be 
used to indicate the overall growth of the rural financial 
system. Several credit-to-output ratios, for example, can 
be used to show changes in the relative amounts of agri-
cultural credit over time. Credit-to-credit ratios can be 
used to show changes in relative amounts lent to various 
sectors of the economy. Details on the term structure of 
loans made by the formal RFM can also be used to indicate 
the extent to which intermediaries are helping to reinforce 
government priorities in medium and long term investments. 
If the government is trying to stimulate the production 
of a particular commodity, information can be assembled on 
the amounts of loans made for that purpose and how these 
amounts change over time. Some interviewing with bank 
employees will be necessary to see how many loans were rede-
fined to meet policy objectives • 
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If a major government object is to control the growth 
of the money supply, the degree to which rural financial 
markets are self-financing would be an important performance 
measure. Also, measures of net flows of funds out of rural 
areas through financial markets also indicate the extent to 
which financial markets help achieve social objectives. 
A small number of measures can be used to indicate the 
vitality of the financial intermediaries handling credit and 
deposit activities in rural areas. These measures include 
repayment records, the extent to which they are able to 
maintain and expand the real amount of funds they lend, 
institutional renaming and reorganization, extent of politi-
cal interference, manager turn over, and the extent to which 
the system is self-financing and able to cover its own costs 
of operation. 
Policies Affecting RFMs 
RFMs are strongly affected by three sets of policies: 
(1) those directed at influencing money supply, the overall 
monetary system, and financial activities in general; (2) 
those directed at rural financial markets; and (3) those 
policies that affect the rates of return that producers in 
rural areas expect from their investments. It is especially 
useful to understand how these policies are made. 
• 
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Gathering information on the first two types of poli-
cies is usually straight forward. Decrees by the monetary 
authority, the ministry of finance, or the central bank 
generally document the intent of these policies. These 
policies include changing the ownership of banks from pri-
vate to government owned, various loan portfolio quotas, 
discount mechanisms, reserve requirements, interest rate 
controls, loan insurance schemes, building new inter-
mediaries, and various reporting and accounting require-
ments. Some original work must generally be done on how 
financial intermediaries interpret and react to these poli-
cies, however. 
Clarifying the extent to which various economic poli-
cies affect the returns to investments in rural areas is 
more difficult. These policies include those that influence 
the prices paid to rural producers, those policies that 
affect the prices rural producers pay for purchased inputs, 
and those policies that affect farm yields. Information on 
these rates of return are critical in RFM physical examina-
tions because of several important and too often neglected 
issues: rates of return affect income and thus repayment 
capacities, expected income also strongly influences the 
amount individuals are willing to borrow with obvious impli-
cations for economies of scale in financial operations. 
And, rates of return along with incomes also strongly 
influence the amounts of money rural individuals have to 
deposit in financial markets • 
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In many low income countries few farm and non-farm 
businesses in rural areas expect to receive high and stable 
returns from their investments. In some cases this is due 
to unproductive resources and to harsh climates. In all too 
many cases, however, these low returns are due to policies 
that depress farm prduct prices, policies that raise the 
price of purchased inputs, and lack of public investment in 
things like irrigation facilities and agricultural research 
that sustain low yields. It is impossible to develop a 
healthy and expanding financial system if most rural produ-
cers serviced are not economically well. 
Because of the heterogeneity that exists among produ-
cers in rural areas it is quite difficult to directly 
measure the rates of return that might be expected from the 
numerous activities carried out in rural areas. Normal 
proxies for these rates of return, loan demand and repayment 
rates, are ofteri useless because of negative real rates of 
interest on loans and the intrusions of politics into loan 
repayment. Even with harsh price controls on agricultural 
products and low yield, there will always be a few rural 
producers who can realize relatively high returns on their 
marginal investments. A few of these producers can make 
profitable use of loan services, pay market rates of 
interest on their loans, and have an excellent chance of 
repaying their loans. In some cases governments may give 
certain segments of the agricultural sector special 
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treatment that results in relatively high returns to produ-
cers in that sector, while many other parts of the agri-
cultural system have poor investment possibilities. 
In most cases unfavorable price policies in the agri-
cultural sector and the lack of government investment 
therein stem from policy consideration. Cheap and abundant 
credit is often the policy response to attempt to offset the 
adverse effects on income distribution and resource alloca-
tion of these broader policy measures. As discussed 
elsewhere, cheap credit fails on both efficiency and equity 
grounds (Adams and others eds.). Low interest rates force 
lenders to concentrate cheap loans in the hands of relati-
vely few people, and low interest rates do not make unprofi-
table investment profitable. 
A number of measures can be used to give general 
insights into rates-of-return questions. If a couple of 
major products like sugar cane or rice are importani in the 
rural economy, a few production function or budgeting stu-
dies of representative farms can give insights into poten-
tial returns from additional liquidity provided by loans. 
Other more general proxies like terms-of-trade between the 
agricultural and non-agricultural sectors, historical yield 
information, and price information on products and inputs 
are also useful to shed light on farm profit questions. The 
rates of return realized by informal lenders in rural areas 
might also be used to indicate the return that at least some 
borrowers realize from borrowed liquidity • 
22 
Donor Involvement 
In some LICs donors have provided a very large part of 
the total funds lent through agricultural credit programs. 
In some cases donors have also been instrumental in helping 
to set up major agenci~s that made up important parts of the 
formal credit system. In other cases donors may have been 
heavily involved in the development or funding of only a 
portion of the rural financial market. In a few of the LICs 
donor assissance has made up only a small part of the 
overall build up in the agricultural credit system. Where 
the World Bank, the regional development banks, or bilateral 
aid agencies are significantly involved, it is necessary to 
understand that involvement as part of the physical examina- ~ 
tion of RFMs. 
It is typical for donor agencies to divide territory in • 
LICs into areas of interest. Understandably, donors like to 
establish long term working relationships with agencies and 
fund a series of projects through these agencies. A repre-
sentative country arrangement would be for the World Bank to 
move its funds into the central bank for rediscounting to 
other elements of the bankings system for agricultural 
loans, for a bilateral aid agency like the Agency for 
International Development to provide funds for a superviseq 
credit program for farmers, and for one of the regional 
development banks, like the Inter-American Development Bank 
• 
. ' 
' ! 
.J 
r 
I 
• 
• 
23 
to provide a number of loans and technical assistance to an 
agricultural bank. In some cases the behavior of a finan-
cial intermediary is strongly shaped and influenced by its 
financial patron. In a few cases aid technicians may have a 
very strong influence on the operation of the intermediary. 
In virtually all cases the donor-supported credit program 
will be heavily flavored by the orthodoxy that prevails in 
the donor agency. 
It is necessary to also establish the extent to which 
donor agencies are involved in setting policies in rural 
financial markets. One should also look at the extent to 
which donor involvement reorients the financial system away 
from traditional sources of liquidity for loan funds and 
also warps their information gathering process. At the same 
time, evaluations and loan documents that are associated 
with donor assistance can often provide valuable information 
about activities in RFMs. 
Involving Policy Makers 
Many of the problems found in RFMs are the result of 
incorrect policies. Improving the performance of these 
markets, as a result, is mainly a problem of getting 
appropriate policies adopted. A well done, written diagno-
sis of RFMs is far from sufficient, in most cases, to get 
some of these very controversial, yet critical policies 
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changed. It generally takes a good deal of convincing of a ~ 
relatively large number of policy makers, technicians, and 
politicians before these policies are seriously considered 
for adjustment. A very important part of the RFM physical 
examination is getting key decision makers in the LIC 
involved in the diagnostic process. This includes represen-. 
tatives of the involved donor agencies. 
Because the main result of the diagnosis must be policy 
changes and not just a written report, extending the results 
of the diagnosis should be a vital part of the process. 
Local researchers, local technicians and mid-level policy 
makers must feel involved in the diagnostic process and 
agree with the conclusion reached. Periodic workshops, 
seminars and conferences with policy makers during the 
diagnosis to keep them up-to-date and involved are very 
important. Doing this well is likely to be more of an art 
than a science. This kind of massaging of policy makers 
takes tact and time. In some cases the analysis must be 
adjusted along the way to meet special concerns that surface 
among policy makers. 
In some cases it is useful to strengthen the capacity of 
local people to do analytic work on RFMs as part of the 
diagnosis. Ideally, this should include helping to develop 
a small research group in one of the local institutions, 
like the central bank, that can continue to do evaluations 
of the RFM after the initial examination of the RFM is 
completed. 
• • 
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Concluding Observations 
I am increasingly convinced that most of the needed 
knowledge is at hand to allow "finance doctors" to substan-
tially improve the performance of rural financial markets in 
many of the low income countries, and that it is possible to 
make quantum jumps in the performance of these markets simi-
lar to those made in production of rice and wheat through 
the miracle varieties of the mid-1960s. But, to do· this it 
will be necessary to substantially improve the physical exa-
minations that are given to rural financial markets, and to 
do a much more systematic job of using these analyses to 
influence policy makers to adopt more appropriate treat-
ments. Because of the very diffused nature of financial 
markets, especially in rural areas, it is easy to be 
overwhelmed by data requirements and complexities in doing a 
diagnosis of these markets. It is very important that the 
right kind of questions be asked, that efficient amounts of 
data be collected to answer these questions, and that syste-
matic and comprehensive procedures be used in the physical 
examination. 
In the past three decades a large part of the analysis 
done on problems of agricultural credit and rural savings 
has focused on the demand for credit, rural savings capaci-
ties, and farmer behavior. The diagnostic steps I suggest 
26 
in this essay place much more emphasis on the supply of 
financial services, on the behavior of financial inter-
mediaries, and on helping policy makers to identify better 
treatments for the ills that bedevil rural financial markets 
in so many of the low income countries. 
' . 
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